This article examines the manner in which Indian Courts have construed the stock exchanges in respect of writ jurisdiction. The article focus on examining the manner in which the courts have perceived the stock exchanges in respect of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and Article 12 of the Constitution. Thereafter, the article scrutinizes the contours of stock exchange liability under Mandamus and Certiorari and analyses the effect of demutualization of stock exchanges on the applicability of writ jurisdiction to stock exchanges. The article concludes by stating that the judgment of the Supreme Court and the division bench of the Delhi High Court in K.C Sharma wherein they have held that the Delhi Stock Exchange is covered within the ambit of “other authorities” under Article 12 and therefore the jurisprudence of fundamental rights applies to it is a sound one. Post demutualization, the above two judgments will still remain the correct law as the basis on which the Stock Exchange was held to be a state was by applying the tests laid down laid in R.D Shetty and Biswas and stating that the tests of various kinds of control are applicable to the stock exchange.
“Stock Exchange” means, “any body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, constituted for the purpose of assisting or controlling the business of buying, selling or dealing in securities.”[i] The history of stock exchanges in foreign countries, as well as in India, shows that the development of joint stock enterprise would have never reached its present stage, but for the facilities which the stock exchanges provided for dealing in securities and they have a very important function to perform in a country’s economy.[ii] Their main function, in the words of an eminent writer, is “to liquefy capital by enabling a person who has invested money in, say, a factory or a railway, to convert it into cash by disposing of his share in the enterprise to someone else.”[iii] Without the stock exchange, the capital would become immobilized.[iv]
In 1925, the Bombay Securities Contract Control Act was passed to regulate and control contracts for the purchase and sale of securities in the City of Bombay and elsewhere in the Bombay Presidency. After the Second World War, the post-war boom gave an unhealthy impetus to the stock exchange transactions.[v] Various expert committees[vi] appointed by the government from time to time considered the question of regulation of stock exchanges and the latest of those committees was the Gorwalla Committee and the report of that committee was circulated to the principal stock exchanges, Chambers of Commerce, and other interested associations and individuals resulting in the enactment of Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (hereinafter Act).[vii] The Act was passed so as to prevent undesirable transactions in securities by regulating the business of dealing therein. Section 4 of the Act empowers the Central Government to recognize stock exchanges. Section 5 of the Act empowers the Central Government to withdraw the recognition granted under Section 4. Section 13 enables the Central Government the Central Government to issue a notification that in a particular state or area every contract which is entered into after the date of the notification otherwise than between members of a recognized stock exchange in such state or area or through or with such member shall be illegal.
Writ Jurisdiction provides an effective safeguard against the violation of the fundamental rights. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court arises out of Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution respectively. Most of the fundamental rights are guaranteed against the state. An entity must satisfy two tests – that it is not “State” under Article 12, and also that it is not a “person or authority” under Article 226 to fall outside the scope of writ jurisdiction, otherwise it has to be prepared to abstain from acting in breach of fundamental rights enlisted in Part III of the Constitution.
A petition challenging the decision of the governing board of the Stock Exchange not to grant membership and seeking mandamus would be maintainable only if stock exchanges are under the purview of an “authority” within the meaning of Article 226.[viii] Similar would be the situation in case of a petition against the action of a stock exchange in the matter of admission of a member or expulsion thereof[ix] and seeking membership without imposing any unreasonable and arbitrary terms.[x] The writ of Mandamus is issued to provide for remedies where a fundamental right is infringed by a statute, statutory order or a non-statutory executive order.[xi] This is the significance of writ jurisdiction against Registered Stock Exchanges.
It is not always possible to get a clear cut answer whether writ jurisdiction applies to a certain body. Courts may regard an entity amenable to writ jurisdiction in respect of certain functions that it may undertake while with respect to certain other functions, it may not be covered.[xii] For instance, The Karnataka Stock Exchange was held to be not amenable to writ jurisdiction as it was not performing a sovereign function.[xiii] In this backdrop, the following questions are examined in this article:
- How the courts have perceived the stock exchanges in respect of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution?
- Whether the Stock Exchanges fall within the ambit of Article 12 under other authorities?
- How have courts interpreted the contours of stock exchange liability under Mandamus and Certiorari?
- What is the effect of demutualization of stock exchanges as regards the applicability of writ jurisdiction?
The article examines the manner in which Indian Courts have construed the stock exchanges in respect of writ jurisdiction. This article is, however, restricted to the examination and scrutiny of judicial process.
The issue of Stock Exchanges being amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court was first raised in SejalRikeenDalal v. Stock Exchange, Bombay[xiv] (hereinafterDalal’s Case). The question before the Bombay High Court was whether the Bombay Stock Exchange can be considered to be to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was contended by the Stock Exchange, Bombay that it is not an “authority” within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree MuktajeeVandasjiswamiSuverna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R Rudani[xv] (herein after referred as Anandi’s Case), where in the court had held that the term “authority” used in Article 226 must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12 of the Constitution. It had said, “The words ‘any person or authority’ used in article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities or the State. They may cover any other person or body performing a public duty. The form of the body concerned is not much very relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in light of the positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.”[xvi] The Bombay Stock Exchange is also a recognized Stock Exchange under the Securities Contracts Regulation Act, 1956. The Court speaking through Mrs. Sujata Manohar J, began by stating that the Bombay Stock Exchange is, therefore a statutory body and the Central Government is vested with supervisory powers under the said Act.[xvii] Moreover, the Stock Exchange is, inter alia, established to assist, regulate and control dealings in Securities and to ensure fair dealings and these are objects of public interest. So, it held following the principle laid down in Anandi’s Case[xviii] that the Bombay Stock Exchange is amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Subsequently the issue[xix] was agitated before the Kerala High Court in Satish Nayak v. Cochin Stock Exchange[xx] (hereinafterSatish’s Case). The Court looked at the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib[xxi] and R.D Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and Others[xxii] and held that there is no existence of deep and pervasive state control. The Court speaking through Shanmugam J, began by stating that the state does not lay down policies for the stock exchanges and apart from being represented by certain Government owned Corporations the management is totally independent of the Government control and there is no material to say that the Stock Exchange is an agency of the Government. The Memorandum of Association does not show that the stock exchange discharges any public duty. Public Education is the duty of a welfare state and if the said duty is performed by a private institution it could be held to be discharging a public duty. But in this case there is no duty cast upon the Government to run stock exchanges and in the absence of it the stock exchange which does the business of securities cannot be termed as discharging public duty.[xxiii] The Kerala High Court also stated expressly that the Decision of Bombay High Court in Dalal’s Case[xxiv] has not been correctly decided and it failed to take note of the ratio laid down in Anandi’s Case.[xxv] The Court held that a writ of a certiorari is not maintainable against Cochin Stock Exchange Ltd. as it is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. We find a complete contrast in decision making where in the Bombay High Court [xxvi] states that the Stock Exchange is dealing with objects of public interest whereas the Kerala High Court [xxvii] stating that the Stock Exchange cannot be termed as discharging public duty.
The Karnataka High Court in R. Jagadeesh Kumar v. P. Srinivasan and Others[xxviii] followed the principle laid down in Satish’s Case.[xxix] The Court speaking through Rajendra Babu J, stated that the Bangalore Stock Exchange in exercising its powers under the Articles of Association in the matters of admission or expulsion of members only owes a duty to that particular member and not to the public at large and does not discharge any public duty which is amenable to writ jurisdiction.[xxx] It stated that the nature of the control that is exercised by the central government from a perusal of provisions referred to from Sections 3 to Section 12 of Act[xxxi] would only indicate as to making provisions for carrying on effective functioning of the Stock Exchange and does not take away the powers of a stock exchange in the matter of internal regulation, namely, to take a decision as to whether a person who is a member of the Stock Exchange should continue to be so or whether a person is entitled to be a member of the stock exchange, as long as the power that is exercised by the stock exchange is within the framework of the statute.[xxxii] Therefore, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the stock exchange in the matter of regulating as to who should be its members and who should be expelled exercises any public duty or discharges any duty to the public at large.[xxxiii]
Subsequently, the Madras High Court in A. Vaidyanathan v. Union of India[xxxiv], speaking through P. Sathasivam J, stated that the regulatory measures by itself are not sufficient in the absence of any other factors like financial assistance, control of management and policies, State protected monopoly status and public functions to make an entity amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.[xxxv] So the Court held that the Madras Stock Exchange Limited is not an authority under Article 226 of the Constitution.
So, we find three High Courts[xxxvi] stating that their respective Stock Exchanges as not coming under the purview of an authority under Article 226 of the Constitution. These three decisions appeared to have settled the controversy.
The Madhya Pradesh High Court was confronted with the question whether the M.P Stock Exchange was “State” within the meaning of Article 12 and if not whether it could still be amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in Rajendra Rathor v. M.P Stock Exchange and Others.[xxxvii] The Court speaking through B.A Khan J, began by stating that a body or association, a society or a corporation may not strictly fall within the definition of “State” under Article 12 and yet may be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, if it satisfied the newly evolved tests of being engaged in discharge of public duty/functioning and responsibility and disclosing an element of public interest in its functioning.[xxxviii]Gone are days when the writ was believed to run only up to the “State” under Article 12 and the concept has undergone a sea change and made spectacular advance over the years widening the frontiers and horizons of the writ jurisdiction.[xxxix] Now it is available even against private persons, bodies, associations and corporations if it is found that a statutory public duty was cast on these and an element of public interest was present in their functioning.[xl] The court then made some pertinent observations: “The stock exchange possesses all the trappings so much so that it owes its existence to the Central Government because it could not be set up without its permission and recognition.[xli] It could be also superseded by it and its business suspended in the interest of trade and public. Its rules and bye-laws are also subject to the approval of the Government or SEBI. Three of its members of the governing body are also nominated by the Government. Its accounts and affairs are subject to Government audit and scrutiny and so on. What is, however, missing is that the Central Government has no hand in its internal functioning and management, or any financial involvement nor any domination in its management.” It then held that eligibility of Stock Exchange as a “State” under Article 12 is a border line issue and even it is not a State under Article 12 it could still be amenable in certain cases where it was shown that it was performing statutory/public duty cast on it under the statute and it would all depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.[xlii]
We find similar analogy also in Rakesh Gupta v. Hyderabad Stock Exchange Limited[xliii], the court speaking through P.S Mishra J, had observed that if the Exchange fails to perform its public duty in the sense that it goes beyond the mandates of its rules and its bye-laws, or in the performance of the same has violated any of the fundamental rights, then a petition under Article 226 is legitimately maintainable.[xliv] Thereby, it had issued a writ of mandamus to the Hyderabad Stock Exchange to issue orders to remove members wrongly admitted as members of the Stock Exchange.
Later in Trilochana K. Doshi v. The Stock Exchange of India and Another[xlv], the same issue was once again raised before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. It referred to the decision in Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Nagpur Electric Light and Power Company Limited[xlvi], wherein it was stated that a public utility has the duty to supply a commodity or to furnish service to the public. This duty exists independently of statutes regulating the manner in which it shall do business or of contracts with municipalities or individuals, and is imposed because the utility is organized to do business affected a public interest and holds itself out to the public as being willing to serve all members thereof and such being the position, a writ can be issued at the instance of any consumer to a public utility concern[xlvii]. The court speaking through S. Radhakrishnan J, began by stating that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can be exercised against any person or authority rendering a public utility service.[xlviii] It then went on to see the way the Mumbai Stock Exchange is regulated by the Central Government under the various statutory provisions of Securities Contracts Regulation Act, 1956.[xlix] Under Section 11 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act (herein after referred as SEBI Act), 1992, the SEBI can regulate the business and the functions of the Exchange, its Governing Board and the members of the Exchange. Under Sections 16, 17 and 18 of the SEBI Act, the Central Government has total control over the SEBI. Ultimately, it was held that a writ of mandamus would lie against the Mumbai Stock Exchange under Article 226 of the Constitution. We find the Court adopting and following the rationale laid down in Dalal’s Case.[l]
In Delhi Stock Exchange v. K.S Sharma[li], a letter patent appeal before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, the Court for the first time had to answer whether the Delhi Stock Exchange is a State under Article 12 of the Constitution. It is to be mentioned that before the courts had been called upon to decide whether Stock Exchanges were amenable to Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but the question of Stock Exchanges being state under Article 12 was never before decided by the courts directly. The Court speaking through S B Sinha J, began by examining the control of the Central Government /SEBI over the stock exchange in terms of the 1956 Act[lii] in order to bring it within the authority contained in Article 12. The Court came to the conclusion that not only stock exchanges perform an important function, its control by the Central Government/ SEBI is deep and pervasive.[liii] The Court also took note of the fact that even the writ petitioner preferred an appeal before SEBI against the impugned order and filed a representation before SEBI which was entertained. The SEBI constituted an independent committee and despite pendency of writ petition before this court arrived at his own finding. This the Court held goes on to show that not only the Central Government but also a statutory authority exercises deep and pervasive control over the Stock Exchange. It further emphasized that it may be that it does not receive any financial assistance, but receiving the financial assistance is not the only criteria for holding that an instrumentality of the state would come within the purview of the definition of “other authorities”.[liv] So, it held that the Delhi Stock Exchange would come under the purview of other authorities under Article 12. This judgment was appealed before the Supreme Court in K.C Sharma v. Delhi Stock Exchange[lv]. The Court speaking through Srikrishna J, simply stated that they were in agreement with the conclusion of the Division Bench that the Delhi Stock Exchange is amenable to the writ jurisdiction.[lvi] But the Apex Court did not give any reasons for being in agreement or arriving at the same conclusion. The judgment of the Apex Court has settled the controversy and now stock exchanges are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of both High Court and Supreme Court.
Since the Court has stated that they were in agreement with the conclusions of the Division Bench in Delhi Stock Exchange v. K.C Sharma[lvii], we have to look at the reasoning laid down by the division bench. The Division Bench had held that the conditions formulated by the Apex Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India[lviii] were satisfied by the Delhi Stock Exchange. The Court held that 1) there is control over the management of the Corporation by the State; 2) the Corporation enjoys state conferred or state protected monopoly status; 3) the functions carried out by the Corporation closely relate to the Governmental functions in as much as a) that it is under deep rooted, all pervasive and extensive control of the Government through the Securities Exchange Board of India under the SEBI Act, 1992 and SCRA of 1956; b) it has a complete monopoly status within the specified territorial limits; c) it carries out important public/state functions that of completely controlling and regulating the transactions in securities in the country.[lix] The judgment of the Division Bench can be state d to be a detailed and well reasoned one. It has simply been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in K.C Sharma v. Delhi Stock Exchange. In this backdrop, Aditya S. Bapat[lx] submits in his article that the Judgment of the Apex Court has been wrongly decided.[lxi] He states that the Supreme Court did not appreciate the effect of some of its earlier decisions especially Federal Bank v. Sagar Thomas[lxii].[lxiii] The Apex Court in Federal Bank was called upon to decide whether Federal Bank, a Private Bank is a private body or falls within the definition of the State or local or other authorities under the control of the Government. The Court speaking through Brijesh Kumar J, stated that the control exercised over the Bank by the Banking Regulation Act, 1941 and the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 is similar to the control exercised over the companies under the Companies Act, 1956.[lxiv] It termed such powers as drastic; nonetheless they remain regulatory in nature.[lxv] The Court held that these companies would usually not be amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and therefore, Federal Bank also is not amenable to writ jurisdiction.[lxvi]Bapat argues that similar is the position of Stock Exchanges under the Securities Contract Regulation Act, 1956 and so the Apex Court erred in holding that the Delhi Stock Exchange is a state under Article 12.[lxvii]
At this juncture, it is pertinent to look at the intention of the drafters and see the meaning they attributed to the term “other authorities” mentioned in Article 12. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar while replying to Mahmoob Ali Baig Sahib Bahadur stated on 25th November, 1948 that:
“The object of the Fundamental Rights is two-fold. First, that every citizen must be in a position to claim those rights. Secondly, they must be binding upon every authority- I shall presently explain what the word ‘Authority’ means- upon every authority which has got either the power to make laws or the power to have discretion vested in it. Therefore, it is quite clear that if the Fundamental Rights are to be clear, then they must be binding not only upon the Central Government, they must be binding not only upon the Central Government, they must not only be binding upon the Provincial Government, they must not only be binding upon the Governments established in Indian States, they must also be binding upon District Local Boards, Municipalities, even village panchayats and taluk boards, in fact, every authority which has been created by law and which has got certain power to make laws, to make rules, or make bye-laws.”[lxviii]
The Registered Stock Exchanges are incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. The Stock Exchanges certainly have power to make rules, bye-laws and discretion is generally vested with them. Therefore, it is submitted that the judgment of the Apex Court and Delhi High Court in K.C Sharma’s case is in consistent with the intention of the framers of the Constitution and it does not suffer from any fallacy. The judgment is also in line with other judgments of the Supreme Court like Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal[lxix], where in the Court speaking through Bhargava J, opined that the expression “other authorities” in Article 12 will thus include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law.
Moreover, the tests laid down in R.D Shetty can be safely stated to be the latest law on the issue of Article 12 as these have been reaffirmed in Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Union of India[lxx] with an additional requirement of brooding presence of government or deep and pervasive control.
In MCX Stock Exchange v. Securities and Exchange Board of India,[lxxi] the SEBI noted that the Delhi High Court in National Stock Exchange of India Ltd v. Central Information Commissioner and others[lxxii] has held that a stock exchange is a public authority as defined by Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 and observed that the short point that emerges is that a stock exchange enjoys a state conferred or state protected monopoly status; carries out important public/state functions that of controlling and regulating the transactions in securities in the country and is a “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.[lxxiii] It then went on to state that the realization that recognized stocks exchange is a “State” and is an extended regulatory arm of the Central Government and SEBI, is reflected in the provisions of SCRA itself.[lxxiv]
Stock Exchanges brings together sellers and buyers, investors and issuers and through information distribution, informed and uninformed market participants.[lxxv] What makes stock exchanges institutions with a distinctive character is that they are both regulators and regulated entities. They are regulators because they oversee the market which they organize. They are regulated because they are subject to the control and supervision of a regulator (SEBI in India).[lxxvi] Five important functions of the Stock Exchange stated by Fleckner can be summarized as follows: 1) Stock Exchanges are Market organizers; 2) Stock Exchanges are information distributors; 3) Stock Exchanges are regulators of the market which they organize. This ranges from compliance surveillance to enforcement; 4) Stock Exchanges set standards of corporate governance through their rules; 5) Stock Exchanges carry on business enterprises.[lxxvii] The Bombay High Court also stated that Stock Exchanges provide what is described as “the first layer of oversight” as in many areas stock exchanges are self regulators.[lxxviii]
“Demutualization” has been defined in Section 2 (ab) of the SCRA, 1956 and it means the segregation of ownership and management from the trading rights of the members of a recognized stock exchange in accordance with a scheme approved by the Securities and Exchange Board of India. Section 4B provides the procedure for corporatization and demutualization. So as a result of demutualization, the traditional “not for- profit” stock exchanges into a “for profit” company.[lxxix] To put it differently, this process of transition from “mutually-owned” association to a company “owned by shareholders”, in other words transforming the legal structure from a mutual form to a business corporation form and privatizing the corporations so constituted, is referred to as demutualization.[lxxx]
The question as to whether a private corporation, such as Sriram Fruits and Fertilizer Industries, would come within the ambit of Article 12 was examined to some extent keeping in view the functions discharged by this corporation, but then no definite pronouncement was made.[lxxxi] The Court stated that, “But we do not propose to decide finally at the present stage whether a private corporation like Shriram would fall within the scope and ambit of Article 12, because we have not had sufficient time to consider and reflect on this question in depth.”[lxxxii] From a closer scrutiny of the judgment, and the court before declining to give a pronouncement had observed, “It is through creative interpretation and bold innovation that the human rights jurisprudence has been developed in our country to a remarkable extent and this forward march of the human rights movement cannot be allowed to be halted by unfounded apprehensions expressed by status quoists.”Their observations of the bench can safely to be stated to be inclining towards making Shriram a state. Also, it is to be noted that R.D Shetty v. International Airport Authority[lxxxiii], has brought public sector corporations within the scope and ambit of Article 12 and subjected them to the discipline of fundamental rights.
This article started by looking into the meaning, origin and the present status of Stock Exchanges. It then looked at the regulatory framework as applicable to Stock Exchanges. It then examined the significance of Writs against Recognised Stock Exchanges. It then proceeded to examine the amenability of stock exchange to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Subsequently, the scope of the phrase “other authorities” under Article 12 was seen with respect to stock exchanges. Thisarticle then critically examined the judgment of the Apex Court in K.C Sharma v. Delhi Stock Exchange and others[lxxxiv]in light of other Apex Court Judgments and the intentions of the drafters of the Constituent Assembly. It then looked at the developments post K.C Sharma’s Case. It then looked at the regulatory role of stock exchanges. Finally, the effect of Demutualization on writ liability on Stock Exchanges was examined andanalyzed.
It is to be stated that the judgment of the Apex Court and the division bench of the Delhi High Court in K.C Sharma wherein they have held that the Delhi Stock Exchange is covered within the ambit of “other authorities” under Article 12 and therefore the jurisprudence of fundamental rights applies to it is a sound one. Post demutualization, the above two judgments will still remain the correct law as the basis on which the Stock Exchange was held to be a state was by applying the tests laid down laid in R.D Shetty and Biswas and stating that the tests of various kinds of control are applicable to the stock exchange and moreover, there is a deep and pervasive control of the Central Government. These are the settled indicia on which an entity’s purview under Article 12 is to be examined.
[ii]Madhubai Amathalal Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 21
[iii]Id., p. 24
[v]Id., p. 25
[vi]Gorwalla Committee, Kania Committee etc.
[viii]SejalRikeenDalal v. The Stock Exchange, Bombay, AIR 1991 Bom 30
[ix] R. Jagadeesh Kumar v. P. Srinivasan, AIR 1995 Kant. 420
[x] A. Vaidyanathan v. Union of India, AIR 1999 Mad 11
[xi] Prabodh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 167
[xiii] R. Jagadeesh Kumar v. P Srinivasan, AIR 1995 Kant. 420
[xiv] AIR 1991 Bom 30
[xv] AIR 1989 SC 1607
[xvi]Id., p. 1613, para 19
[xvii]Securities Contract Regulation Act, 1956, § 3, § 4
[xviii]Supra note 16
[xix] Whether the Cochin Stock Exchange Limited, a Company registered under the Companies Act is amenable to Writ Jurisdiction?
[xx] AIR 1995 Ker 373
[xxi] AIR 1981 SC 487
[xxii] AIR 1979 SC 1628
[xxiii]Id., p.376, para 13
[xxiv]Supra note 15
[xxv]Supra note 16
[xxvi] See SejalRikeenDalal v. Stock Exchange, Bombay, AIR 1991 Bom 30
[xxvii] See Satish Nayak v. Cochin Stock Exchange, AIR 1995 Ker 373
[xxviii] AIR 1995 Kant. 420
[xxix]Supra note 21
[xxx]Supra note 29
[xxxi] Securities Contract Regulations Act, 1956
[xxxii]Supra note 29 at 425, para 9
[xxxiv] AIR 1999 Mad 11
[xxxv]Id., p. 22, para 26
[xxxvi] Kerala High Court, Karnataka High Court and Madras High Court
[xxxvii]  102 Comp Cas 300 (MP)
[xxxviii]Id, para 7
[xli]Securities Contract Regulation Act, 1956, § 4
[xlii]Supra note 3, 8para 26
[xliii] AIR 1996 AP 413
[xliv]Id., p. 434, para 34
[xlv] 100 Comp Cas 649
[xlvi] AIR 1958 Bom 498
[xlvii]Id., p. 506, para 47
[xlviii]Supra note 46 at. 657, para 20
[xlix] Section 3 read with section 19 of the Act states that the said exchange is recognized by the Central Government. Section 5 empowers the Central Government to withdraw the recognition, thereby to shut down the exchange.
[l]Supra Note 15
[li] 98 (2002) DLT 234
[lii]Supra note 50
[liii]Supra note 52, para 20
[lv] AIR 2005 SC 2884
[lvi]Id., p. 2887, para 13
[lvii]Supra note 52
[lviii] AIR 1979 SC 1628
[lix]Supra note 58, para 61
[lx] Advocate, Bombay High Court
[lxi] Aditya S. Bapat, StockExchanges and their Amenability to Writ Jurisdiction, available at:
https://www.airwebworld.com/articles/index.php?article=1405 last visited on 22/3/12
[lxii] (2003) 10 SCC 755
[lxiii]Supra note 59
[lxiv]Supra note 60 at 755, para 25
[lxvi]Id., p. 756, para 27
[lxvii]Supra note 59
[lxviii] VII, Constituent Assembly Debates (November 25, 1948), p. 610
[lxix] AIR 1967 SC 1857
[lxx](2002) 5 SCC 111
[lxxi] https://www.sebi.gov.in/cmorder/MCXExchange.pdf last visited on 19/4/2012 (Coram: DR. K.M Abraham)
[lxxii]WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 4748 OF 2007, accessed from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/845252/ last visited on 20/4/2012 (CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA)
[lxxiii]Id., para 106
[lxxiv]Id., para 107
[lxxv] MCX Stock Exchange Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, WRIT PETITION NO. 213 of 2011 (Coram: Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Anoop V. Mohta,JJ). See also Andreas M Fleckner, “Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads”, 17 Fordham Law Review 213
[lxxvi]Id., para 48
[lxxvii]Supra note 76, para 49
[lxxviii]Id., para 51
[lxxix] Report of the Group on Corporatization and Demutualization of Stock Exchanges available at https://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2003/smdcir03.html last visited on 19/4/2012.
[lxxxi] M.C Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086
[lxxxiii]Supra note 59
[lxxxiv]Supra note 56.
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